Strategic Choice and International Relations
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Bounded rationality
Calculation
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Colonialism
Competition
Criticism
Darwinism
Decision-making
Democratic peace theory
Determination
Deterrence (legal)
Economic integration
Economic policy
Economics
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Evolutionary game theory
Explanation
Explanatory power
Foreign direct investment
Foreign policy
Free trade
Governance
Great power
Hegemony
Ideology
Imperialism
Institution
International organization
International political economy
International relations
International security
International trade
Legislation
Level of analysis
Monetary policy
Multilateralism
National security
Neoliberalism
New institutionalism
Political economy
Political science
Politics
Postmodernism
Prediction
Preference (economics)
Prisoner's dilemma
Probability
Protectionism
Ratification
Rational choice theory
Rationality
Regime
Requirement
Result
Security dilemma
Security studies
Social science
Tariff
Tax
Technology
Theory
Theory of International Politics
Trade agreement
Trade preference
Treaty
UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
Uncertainty
Voting
War
World War I
World War II
Product details
- ISBN 9780691026978
- Weight: 397g
- Dimensions: 197 x 254mm
- Publication Date: 08 Aug 1999
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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The strategic-choice approach has a long pedigree in international relations. In an area often rent by competing methodologies, editors David A. Lake and Robert Powell take the best of accepted and contested knowledge among many theories. With the contributors to this volume, they offer a unifying perspective, which begins with a simple insight: students of international relations want to explain the choices actors make--whether these actors be states, parties, ethnic groups, companies, leaders, or individuals. This synthesis offers three new benefits: first, the strategic interaction of actors is the unit of analysis, rather than particular states or policies; second, these interactions are now usefully organized into analytic schemes, on which conceptual experiments may be based; and third, a set of methodological "bets" is then made about the most productive ways to analyze the interactions.
Together, these elements allow the pragmatic application of theories that may apply to a myriad of particular cases, such as individuals protesting environmental degradation, governments seeking to control nuclear weapons, or the United Nations attempting to mobilize member states for international peacekeeping. Besides the editors, the six contributors to this book, all distinguished scholars of international relations, are Jeffry A. Frieden, James D. Morrow, Ronald Rogowski, Peter Gourevitch, Miles Kahler, and Arthur A. Stein. Their work is an invaluable introduction for scholars and students of international relations, economists, and government decision-makers.
David A. Lake is Research Director for International Relations at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, and Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. He is the author of Entangling Relations (Princeton). Robert Powell is Robson Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. He has written widely on the application of game theory to issues in strategic studies and international relations theory. He is the author of Nuclear DeterrenceTheory: The Search for Credibility and In the Shadow of Power.
