A01=Stefano Recchia
Abkhazia
Author_Stefano Recchia
Bosnia
Category=JPQB
Category=JPSD
Category=JW
Chad
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France
International Organizations
Intervention
Iraq
Ivory Coast
Legitimacy
Libya
Military Force
Multilateral Intervention
Persian Gulf
Russia
Rwanda
Security Council
United Nations
Veto
Product details
- ISBN 9780300270587
- Dimensions: 156 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 28 Oct 2025
- Publisher: Yale University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Hardback
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A thoughtful analysis of how major powers can obtain UN Security Council approval for military intervention
Powerful states often seek UN Security Council approval for their military interventions to enhance legitimacy, but how can they secure this approval when veto-wielding permanent members have grave misgivings? In this groundbreaking study of UNSC diplomacy, Stefano Recchia tackles this question by drawing on hundreds of declassified documents and interviews that he conducted with top diplomats from multiple countries.
Recchia demonstrates that since the early 1990s, powerful states facing significant opposition at the UNSC have not been able to rely solely on economic and political leverage to obtain a resolution of approval. Instead, they have had to combine exertions of leverage with credible signals that they would act with restraint and in line with core international norms. This often required that they agree to incorporate costly limitations on the use of force, such as time limits and multilateral oversight, into the requested resolution. Recchia argues that for better or worse accepting such constraints will be critical in the future if powerful countries, including the United States, are to secure UN approval in an increasingly competitive international environment.
Powerful states often seek UN Security Council approval for their military interventions to enhance legitimacy, but how can they secure this approval when veto-wielding permanent members have grave misgivings? In this groundbreaking study of UNSC diplomacy, Stefano Recchia tackles this question by drawing on hundreds of declassified documents and interviews that he conducted with top diplomats from multiple countries.
Recchia demonstrates that since the early 1990s, powerful states facing significant opposition at the UNSC have not been able to rely solely on economic and political leverage to obtain a resolution of approval. Instead, they have had to combine exertions of leverage with credible signals that they would act with restraint and in line with core international norms. This often required that they agree to incorporate costly limitations on the use of force, such as time limits and multilateral oversight, into the requested resolution. Recchia argues that for better or worse accepting such constraints will be critical in the future if powerful countries, including the United States, are to secure UN approval in an increasingly competitive international environment.
Stefano Recchia is John G. Tower Distinguished Chair in International Politics and National Security at Southern Methodist University. He lives in Dallas, TX.
