Strategy For Terminating A Nuclear War
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A01=Clark C Abt
ABM
arms control policy
Author_Clark C Abt
Battlefield Nuclear Weapons
Category=JP
controlled nuclear war termination
Deterrent Failures
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
escalation management
Federal Republic Of Germany
Ground Forces
ICBM
limited nuclear conflict
Limited Nuclear War
military-political decision making
National Command Authorities
NATO
NATO Force
NATO Headquarter
NATO Nation
Naval Forces
nuclear deterrence theory
Nuclear Disarmament
Nuclear War
Nuclear War Termination
Nuclear Weapons
retaliatory invasion strategy
Soviet ICBM
Termination Strategy
Total Nuclear War
United States
Vice Versa
Violating
War Termination
West Germany
Product details
- ISBN 9780367158347
- Weight: 400g
- Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
- Publication Date: 13 Jun 2023
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Paperback
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Avoiding a nuclear war, or ending one if avoidance fails, is an important but relatively unexplored aspect of nuclear doctrine. Dr. Abt examines the feasibility of antagonists' agreeing to exclude their open cities from nuclear targeting and to replace strategic bombardment with retaliatory invasion to create less of a hair[1]trigger deterrent. Critical net assessments by U.S. strategists and the effects of such a strategy on the Soviet Union and on U.S. allies are considered, along with problems implementation might pose. The author contends that both deterrence and the potential for limiting damage are strengthened by pre-war plans for a nuclear ceasefire and stalemate short of holocaust.
Dr. Clark C. Abt is founder and president of Abt Associates Inc., a private social and economic policy research firm in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
