A01=Michael A. Hennessy
Author_Michael A. Hennessy
Category=JWL
Category=NHF
Category=NHK
eq_bestseller
eq_history
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
Military History
Product details
- ISBN 9780275956677
- Weight: 482g
- Dimensions: 156 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 21 Aug 1997
- Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Hardback
Secure
checkout
Fast Shipping
Easy returns
Grand strategy, strategy, and tactics—the three layers of policy and action inherent to all military efforts—are the focus of this historical analysis of the dynamics of the Vietnam War. The American theory of counterrevolutionary warfare is examined in light of American military practice, especially that of the Marine Corps, during the period of America's greatest involvement, 1965-1972, and at the site of the most intense combat, the five northern provinces known as I Corps. Drawing from two schools of thought that diverge over the appropriate strategy America should have pursued in South Vietnam, this inquiry indicates that both the number of troops and their tactical employment proved inadequate for redressing the threat within the parameters America set for itself. Specifically, this work demonstrates that the counterrevolutionary warfare strategy postulated for Vietnam was largely ignored in some quarters, and sowed the seeds of defeat in others.
MICHAEL A. HENNESSY is Assistant Professor of History at the Royal Military College of Canada.
