Case for Gridlock

Regular price €112.99
Quantity:
In stock with our UK publisher. 14-28 days
Delivery/Collection within 10-20 working days
14 days return policy Shipping & Delivery
A01=Marcus E. Ethridge
Age Group_Uncategorized
Age Group_Uncategorized
American Government
American Political Thought
Author_Marcus E. Ethridge
automatic-update
Campaigns and Elections
Category1=Non-Fiction
Category=JPHV
COP=United States
Delivery_Delivery within 10-20 working days
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Language_English
PA=Available
Parties
Policy and Law
Political Development
Political Science
Price_€100 and above
PS=Active
softlaunch

Product details

  • ISBN 9780739142370
  • Weight: 528g
  • Dimensions: 163 x 241mm
  • Publication Date: 30 Mar 2010
  • Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
  • Publication City/Country: US
  • Product Form: Hardback
  • Language: English
Secure checkout Fast Shipping Easy returns

The Case for Gridlock explains how Progressive ideas about government have led to severe representational problems in the American political system. Having rejected the Framers' institutional arrangement as sluggish and frustrating, Progressives have, for over a century, worked to circumvent the Madisonian system by establishing policy-making power in executive agencies and commissions. Ironically, the most consequential legacy of Progressivism is an institutional system that became more perfectly and efficiently responsive to the inherently unbalanced organized political power that they lament. Drawing on an analysis of administrative law and decades of research on interest groups, The Case for Gridlock explores the faulty logic and naïve thinking of the Progressive perspective, revealing the uncertainties and anomalies in legal doctrine that have emerged as a result of their effort to graft "efficient" designs onto the gridlock-prone system that James Madison and the other Framers left us.

The problems of "interest group liberalism" and the accumulation of powerful interests that undermine economic growth and political stability have long been recognized by political scientists and economists. The Case for Gridlock argues that these problems are not inevitable and that a solution exists in reasserting the Constitutional Principle as the foundation for the design and operation of U.S. governmental institutions. The public's interests can prevail over those of organized special interests by returning power to the gridlock-prone institutional arrangement established in the Constitution.

Marcus E. Ethridge is professor emeritus in the Deparment of Political Science at University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.

More from this author