A01=James H. Lebovic
Age Group_Uncategorized
Age Group_Uncategorized
Author_James H. Lebovic
automatic-update
Category1=Non-Fiction
Category=JPS
Category=JPSH
Category=JPSL
Category=JWM
COP=United States
Delivery_Delivery within 10-20 working days
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Language_English
PA=Available
Price_€20 to €50
PS=Active
softlaunch
Product details
- ISBN 9780197680872
- Weight: 422g
- Dimensions: 236 x 154mm
- Publication Date: 13 Mar 2023
- Publisher: Oxford University Press Inc
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
- Language: English
Secure
checkout
Fast Shipping
Easy returns
This political analysis exposes the fanciful logic that the United States can use nuclear weapons to vanquish nuclear adversaries or influence them when employing various coercive tactics.
During the Cold War, American policymakers sought nuclear advantages to offset an alleged Soviet edge. Policymakers hoped that US nuclear capabilities would safeguard deterrence, when backed perhaps by a set of coercive tactics. But policymakers also hedged their bets with plans to fight a nuclear war to their advantage should deterrence fail. In The False Promise of Superiority, James H. Lebovic argues that the US approach was fraught with peril and remains so today. He contends that the United States can neither simply impose its will on nuclear adversaries nor safeguard deterrence using these same coercive tactics without risking severe, counterproductive effects. As Lebovic shows, the current faith in US nuclear superiority could produce the disastrous consequences that US weapons and tactics are meant to avoid. This book concludes that US interests are best served when policymakers resist the temptation to use, or prepare to use, nuclear weapons first or to brandish nuclear weapons for coercive effect.
James H. Lebovic is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George Washington University. He has published widely on defense policy, deterrence strategy, arms control, military budgets and procurement, foreign aid, democracy and human rights, international organizations, international conflict and cooperation, and military intervention. He previously authored six books including Planning to Fail: The US War in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan (Oxford, 2019), Flawed Logics: Strategic Nuclear Arms Control from Truman to Obama (2013), The Limits of US Military Capability: Lessons from Vietnam and Iraq (2010), and Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security Policy after 9/11 ( 2007). From 2015-2017, he chaired the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association.
