A01=Christopher Gelpi
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Anarchy Is What States Make of It
Anocracy
Appeasement
Attempt
Author_Christopher Gelpi
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Bargaining power
Blockade
Bullying
Casus belli
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Causality
Ceasefire
Classical realism (international relations)
Client state
Coercion
Combatant
Conciliation
Consent of the governed
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Defense pact
Defensive realism
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Democratic peace theory
Determination
Deterrence (legal)
Deterrence theory
Dispute resolution
Effectiveness
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External validity
Foreign policy
Freedom of navigation
Good faith
Great power
Imperialism
Inference
Injunction
Innocent passage
Institution
Interdiction
Internal validity
International crisis
International relations
International security
John Mearsheimer
Language_English
Longevity
Material fact
Militarism
National interest
National power
National security
Norm of reciprocity
Offensive realism
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Power projection
Prediction
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Prima facie
Probability
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Rational choice theory
Regime change
Regime theory
Reprisal
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Sovereign state
Sovereignty
Soviet Union
Statistical significance
Stipulation
Territorial integrity
Territorial waters
The Evolution of Cooperation
The Other Hand
Treaty
U Thant
Westphalian sovereignty
Product details
- ISBN 9780691146713
- Weight: 312g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 10 Jan 2010
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
- Language: English
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A major departure from mainstream security studies, this book mounts a thoughtful challenge to realist theories of crisis bargaining. It tests the proposition that normative standards of behavior influence state actions in security-related conflicts. Specifically, it examines the construction of bilateral norms as the settlements of security-related disputes and the effects these settlements have on subsequent interactions over the same issue. Drawing on institutionalist arguments about the informational impact of norms, Christopher Gelpi contends that norms act as signals that give meaning to other states' behavior in at least two important ways. First, they provide a mutually acceptable focal point for limiting both demands and concessions. Second, security norms change the context in which coercive behavior is interpreted. That is, norms can cause coercive behavior to be interpreted as punishment rather than aggression. Gelpi tests this argument against its most prominent competitor--a realist model of crisis bargaining--in three stages.
First, he uses a probit analysis to perform a quantitative test on the population of 122 reinitiated international crises between 1929 and 1979. Second, he conducts detailed case studies of the Cienfuegos Submarine Conflict and the Six Day War. Finally, he conducts a second statistical analysis examining the conditions under which security norms will succeed or fail. While hypotheses derived from realist coercion theory receive only mixed support, Gelpi finds strong evidence that states can and do construct normative standards that guide their behavior in international crises.
Christopher Gelpi is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duke University.
