A01=Peter C. Fishburn
Abelian group
Admissible set
Age Group_Uncategorized
Age Group_Uncategorized
Almost surely
Antisymmetric relation
Arrow's impossibility theorem
Associative property
Asymmetric relation
Author_Peter C. Fishburn
automatic-update
Axiom
Bijection
Binary decision
Binary relation
Boundary (topology)
Calculation
Category1=Non-Fiction
Category=JHB
Choice function
Codomain
Coefficient
Combination
Condorcet criterion
Connected space
Connectedness
Converse implication
COP=United States
Corollary
Cyclic permutation
Decision rule
Decision-making
Delivery_Pre-order
Duality (optimization)
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Equivalence class
Equivalence relation
Estimation
Existential quantification
Group theory
Hypothesis
Language_English
Law of total probability
Majority function
Markov process
Maxima and minima
May's theorem
Monotonic function
Order condition
PA=Temporarily unavailable
Permutation
Power set
Preference (economics)
Preference relation
Preorder
Price_€100 and above
Probability
Probability distribution
Proportional representation
PS=Active
Ranking (information retrieval)
Recursive definition
Reflexive relation
Relative interior
Set (mathematics)
Set theory
Sign function
Social choice theory
softlaunch
Special case
State of affairs (sociology)
Subgroup
Subset
Suggestion
Summation
Theorem
Theory
Total order
Transitive relation
Union (set theory)
Universal set
Utility
Voting
Weak ordering
Product details
- ISBN 9780691646114
- Weight: 567g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 19 Apr 2016
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Hardback
- Language: English
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One fundamental premise of democratic theory is that social policy, group choice, or collective action should be based on the preferences of the individuals in the society, group, or collective. Using the tools of formal mathematical analysis, Peter C. Fishburn explores and defines the conditions for social choice and methods for synthesizing individuals' preferences. This study is unique in its emphasis on social choice functions, the general position that individual indifference may not be transitive, and the use of certain mathematics such as linear algebra. The text is divided into three main parts: social choice between two alternatives, which examines a variety of majority-like functions; simple majority social choice, which focuses on social choice among many alternatives when two-element feasible subset choices are based on simple majority; and a general study of aspects and types of social choice functions for many alternatives. Originally published in 1973. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press.
These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
