Time, Embodiment and the Self

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A01=Andros Loizou
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Author_Andros Loizou
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Black Plinth
British Idealist Philosopher
Categorical Desires
Category1=Non-Fiction
Category=HPJ
Category=QD
Category=QDTJ
Central Characterisation
Constitutive Attachments
COP=United Kingdom
Delivery_Pre-order
Dimensional Object
Dimensional Things
ecstatic temporality
embodied self temporality analysis
embodiement
Embodiment
eq_isMigrated=2
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Ground Project
Kant's Groundwork
Language_English
Le Poidevin
metaphysics of will
narrative identity theory
PA=Temporarily unavailable
phenomenological philosophy
Phenomenon Noumenon Distinction
Present Tense Statement
Price_€20 to €50
PS=Active
Real Time II
redrawing
Sartre's Account
Sartre's Ontology
softlaunch
SP
Swann's Love
Temporal Ekstasen
temporal experience
Temporal Parts
Tenseless Facts
Tenseless Theorists
Tenseless Truth Conditions
time
tripartite psyche
understanding
Vice Versa

Product details

  • ISBN 9781138712928
  • Weight: 140g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 219mm
  • Publication Date: 16 Jan 2019
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Paperback
  • Language: English
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This title was first published in 2000:  Beginning with a sustained argument against the new tenseless theory of time and against McTaggart's A series/B series distinction, the author of this essay goes on to provide a non-paradoxical, tensed, phenomenologically-based account of the 'going on' or 'taking place' of events in time that escapes the paradoxes endemic to 'passage' as understood via the A series/B series distinction. The author then turns his attention to the other main aim of the essay, which is to seek an understanding of time adequate to those more 'embodied' conceptions of the self that place character, and with it the 'constitutive attachments' or 'ground projects' of individual life circumstance, at the centre of the self. This involves a 'redrawing' of the self informed by a wider conception of the will than the one we have inherited via Descartes and Kant, by an account of ground projects, and by the theory of the tripartite psyche in Plato's Republic.

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