Transparency and Apperception

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Agential Approach
analytic philosophy
Category=QDTM
Determined Thinking
empirical apperception
epistemic responsibility
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
first-person authority
Honest Assertion
Intelligible World
Kant's Account
Kant's Practical Philosophy
Kant's Theoretical Philosophy
Kantian self-consciousness
Kantian transparency debate
Kant’s Account
Kant’s Practical Philosophy
Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy
Mental Sentence
mental state attribution
Mental Utterances
mind philosophy
Non-positional Consciousness
Non-thetic Self-consciousness
Objective World Order
Original Synthetic Unity
Outer Sense
Perceptive Introspector
Phenomenal Transparency
philosophy of mind
Priori Entitlement
Priori Warrant
Pure Apperception
Sartrean Approach
Sincere Assertion
Synthetic Unity
Transcendental Apperception
transparency
Unhappy Childhood

Product details

  • ISBN 9780367513023
  • Weight: 453g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 29 Jan 2024
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Paperback
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Transparency and Apperception: Exploring the Kantian Roots of a Contemporary Debate explores the links between the idea that belief is transparent and Kant’s claims about apperception.

Transparency is the idea that a person can answer questions about whether she, for instance, believes something by considering, not her own psychological states, but the objects and properties the belief is about. This marks a sharp contrast between a first-person and third-person perspective on one’s current mental states. This idea has deep roots in Kant’s doctrine of apperception, the claim that the human mind is essentially self-conscious, and Kant held that it underlies the responsibility that a person has for certain of their own mental states. Nevertheless, the idea of transparency and its roots in apperception remain obscure and give rise to difficult methodological and exegetical questions. The contributions in this work address these questions and will be required reading for anyone working on this intersection of the philosophy of mind and language, and epistemology.

The chapters in this book were originally published in a special issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

Boris Hennig, David Hunter and Thomas Land are faculty members in the Philosophy Department at Ryerson University in Toronto, Canada.