Trust Responsibly

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A01=Jakob Ohlhorst
agent epistemic status
arbitrariness
Author_Jakob Ohlhorst
Belief Set
bizarreness
Category=JM
Category=QDHR
Category=QDTK
Category=QDTM
Category=QDTQ
certainty
Claim Entitlement
cognitive dispositions
Cognitive Project
cognitive psychology
common sense
core cognition
deep disagreement
demarcation problem
Dual Process Theories
dual-process theory
entitlement
epistemic entitlement
Epistemic Excellence
Epistemic Good
Epistemic Trust
Epistemic Virtue
Epistemic Warrant
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Error Theory
Evidential Justification
Hinge Beliefs
hinge epistemology
Hinge Propositions
Jakob Ohlhorst
Mind Independent Reality
non-evidential justification in epistemology
Priori Insight
relativism
reliabilism
responsibilism
Responsibilist Virtue
Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology
Rule Proposition
Sceptical Arguments
scepticism
skepticism
Transcendental Argument
trust
Vice Versa
virtue epistemology
Virtue Reliabilism
Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein philosophy

Product details

  • ISBN 9781032449074
  • Weight: 294g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 30 Jan 2025
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Paperback
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This book offers a defence of Wrightean epistemic entitlement, one of the most prominent approaches to hinge epistemology. It also systematically explores the connections between virtue epistemology and hinge epistemology.

According to hinge epistemology, any human belief set is built within and upon a framework of pre-evidential propositions – hinges – that cannot be justified. Epistemic entitlement argues that we are entitled to trust our hinges. But there remains a problem. Entitlement is inherently unconstrained and arbitrary: We can be entitled to any hinge proposition under the right circumstances. In this book, the author argues that we need a non-arbitrariness clause that protects entitlement from defeat. This clause, he argues, is to require epistemic virtue. Virtuous cognitive dispositions provide the non-arbitrariness clause that protects entitlement from defeat. The epistemic character of the agent who holds a particular set of hinges tells us something about the hinges’ epistemic status. Conversely, epistemic virtues are cognitive dispositions and capacities that rely on hinge propositions – without trusting in some hinges, we would be unable to exercise our virtues.

Trust Responsibly will appeal to scholars and advanced students working on epistemology, Wittgenstein, and virtues.

The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND) 4.0 license.

Jakob Ohlhorst is a postdoc at the Universities of Vienna and Amsterdam. Previously, he completed his Dr. Phil. at the University of Cologne. He has published ‘Epistemic Austerity’ at Synthese and ‘Dual Processes, Dual Virtues’ at Philosophical Studies, and both papers make key arguments for this book.

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