A01=Filippo Ferrari
Aesthetics
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analytic philosophy
Author_Filippo Ferrari
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Category1=Non-Fiction
Category=CFG
Category=HPQ
Category=QDTQ
COP=United States
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Disagreement
Epistemic Norms
epistemology
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eq_dictionaries-language-reference
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Ethics
evaluative domains
Inquiry
judgment
Language_English
linguistics
Matters of Taste
metaethics
metaphysics
minimalism
normative alethic pluralism
normativity
PA=Available
philosophy of language
Pluralism
Price_€50 to €100
PS=Active
semantics
softlaunch
Truth
Product details
- ISBN 9781793622679
- Weight: 499g
- Dimensions: 161 x 227mm
- Publication Date: 22 Nov 2021
- Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Hardback
- Language: English
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Truth and Norms: Normative Alethic Pluralism and Evaluative Disagreements engages three philosophical topics and the relationships among them. Filippo Ferrari first contributes to the debate on the nature and normative significance of disagreement, especially in relation to evaluative judgements such as judgements about basic taste, refined aesthetics, and moral matters. Second, he addresses the issue of epistemic normativity, focusing in particular on the normative function(s) that truth exerts on judgements. Third, he contributes to the debate on truth—more specifically, which account of the nature of truth best accommodates the norms relating judgements and truth. This book develops and defends a novel pluralistic picture of the normativity of truth: normative alethic pluralism (NAP). At the core of NAP is the idea that truth exerts different normative functions in relation to different areas of inquiry. Ferrari argues that this picture of the normativity of truth offers the best explanation of the variable normative significance that disagreement exhibits in relation to different subject matters—from a rather shallow normative impact in the case of disagreement about taste, to a normatively more substantive significance in relation to moral judgements. Last, Ferrari defends the view that NAP does not require a commitment to truth pluralism, since it is fully compatible with a somewhat refined version of minimalism about truth.
Filippo Ferrariis a researcher in philosophy at the University of Bonn, working within the remit of the DFG-funded project "Abductive Methods in the Philosophy of Logic" as part of the research cluster "Inductive Metaphysics."
