A01=Cheryl Misak
Anti-objectivist Positions
anti-realism philosophy
Author_Cheryl Misak
Background Beliefs
belief
Category=QDTQ
Cognitive Command
Comprehensive Doctrines
deliberation
deliberative
democracy
Duhem Thesis
epistemic justification
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
experiment
Follow
Goldbach's Conjecture
Goldbach’s Conjecture
Good Life
Held
Inclined
inquiry
Inverted Spectrum Hypothesis
judgements
justification in democracy
Logical Belief
Moral Deliberation
Moral Inquiry
Neutrality Principle
Original Position
pluralist ethics
political normativity
Pragmatic Elucidation
Pragmatist Epistemology
pragmatist moral epistemology
predicate
public reason theory
Recalcitrant Experience
Schmittian Challenge
thought
Transcendental Argument
true
True Belief
Truth Predicate
Unforced Agreement
Young Man
Product details
- ISBN 9780415140362
- Weight: 300g
- Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
- Publication Date: 25 Nov 1999
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Paperback
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Cheryl Misak argues that truth ought to be reinstated to a central position in moral and political philosophy. She argues that the correct account of truth is one found in a certain kind of pragmatism: a true belief is one upon which inquiry could not improve, a belief which would not be defeated by experience and argument. This account is not only an improvement on the views of central figures such as Rawls and Habermas, but it can also make sense of the idea that, despite conflict, pluralism, and the expression of difference, our moral and political beliefs aim at truth and can be subject to criticism.
Anyone interested in a fresh discussion of political theory and philosophy will find this a fascinating read.
