Trying Without Willing
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€192.20
A01=Timothy Cleveland
action
Agent's De
analytic philosophy
Arm Raising
Arm Rise
Author_Timothy Cleveland
awareness
Basic Bodily Movement
bodily
Bodily Movements
brain
Brain Events
Cartesian dualism
Cartesian Picture
Category=QDTM
critique of volitional theories of action
Davidsonian Principles
Davidsonian Thesis
de re intentionality
Dream Test
Easily Successful
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
event
Evil Deceivers
incorrigible
Incorrigible Awareness
intentional
Intentional Bodily Movement
Intentional Nature
mental causation
Mere Physical Happenings
Mind's Role
movement
Natural Kind Terms
Omniscient Observer
overt
Overt Bodily Movements
philosophy of action
physical
Pineal Gland
psychological essentialism
Singular Thoughts
Split Brain Case
Split Brain Patient
Product details
- ISBN 9781859726747
- Weight: 560g
- Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
- Publication Date: 04 Jul 1997
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Hardback
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Within the context of a critique of volitional accounts of action based on trying, Trying Without Willing articulates a conception of intentional action based on the notion of de re intention. A central theme is that volitional theories of action based on the concept of trying presuppose dubious Cartesian assumptions about the nature of mind and mental states. There is an original account of Cartesianism which captures how even the orthodox materialist theories of action are bound by Cartesian assumptions. Articulating criticisms of contemporary volitional theories against the backdrop of this Cartesian picture provides a diagnosis of what is amiss with all these views and helps motivate a new view of the mind and its role in intentional action. This view has some affinities with the view of perception which Hilary Putnam recently articulated in his Dewey Lectures and John McDowell developed in his recent book Mind and World. This book will be of interest to professional philosophers and graduate students as well as anyone seriously interested in the philosophy of mind, the nature of intentional action, the problem of mental causation, or the influence of Cartesiansim in contemporary analytic philosophy.
Timothy Cleveland, New Mexico State University, USA
