Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements

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A01=Edward D. Mansfield
A01=Helen V. Milner
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Author_Edward D. Mansfield
Author_Helen V. Milner
Autocracy
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Binomial regression
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Category=KCP
Centrism
Coefficient
COP=United States
Customs union
Debt
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Democracy
Doha Development Round
Domestic policy
Dummy variable (statistics)
Economic growth
Economic integration
Economic interventionism
Economic policy
Economic union
Economics
Economist
Economy
eq_business-finance-law
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Estimation
Externality
Factors of production
Free trade
Globalization
Government
Head of government
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Institution
International political economy
International relations
International trade
Language_English
Left-wing politics
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Liberalization
Market power
Mercosur
Monetary policy
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Multilateralism
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North American Free Trade Agreement
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Political economy
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Politician
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Probability
Protectionism
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Ratification
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Rent-seeking
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softlaunch
Statistical significance
Tariff
Theory
Trade agreement
Trade barrier
Trade bloc
Transaction cost
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University of Pennsylvania
Veto Players
Voting
Welfare
Wide Variety
World Trade Organization
World War II

Product details

  • ISBN 9780691135304
  • Weight: 340g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
  • Publication Date: 27 May 2012
  • Publisher: Princeton University Press
  • Publication City/Country: US
  • Product Form: Paperback
  • Language: English
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Preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) play an increasingly prominent role in the global political economy, two notable examples being the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement. These agreements foster economic integration among member states by enhancing their access to one another's markets. Yet despite the importance of PTAs to international trade and world politics, until now little attention has been focused on why governments choose to join them and how governments design them. This book offers valuable new insights into the political economy of PTA formation. Many economists have argued that the roots of these agreements lie in the promise they hold for improving the welfare of member states. Others have posited that trade agreements are a response to global political conditions. Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner argue that domestic politics provide a crucial impetus to the decision by governments to enter trade pacts. Drawing on this argument, they explain why democracies are more likely to enter PTAs than nondemocratic regimes, and why as the number of veto players--interest groups with the power to block policy change--increases in a prospective member state, the likelihood of the state entering a trade agreement is reduced. The book provides a novel view of the political foundations of trade agreements.
Edward D. Mansfield is the Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. Helen V. Milner is the B. C. Forbes Professor of Public Affairs at Princeton University.