A01=Hein Goemans
Absolute war
Allies of World War I
Allies of World War II
Alsace-Lorraine
Annexation
Armistice
Austria-Hungary
Author_Hein Goemans
Battle of Passchendaele
Belgium in World War II
Belligerent
Blockade
Blockade of Germany (1939-45)
Bolsheviks
Brusilov Offensive
Category=JPA
Category=JW
Category=NHB
Category=NHD
Category=NHWR5
Central Powers
Combatant
Crimean War
Decisive victory
Declaration of war
Demobilization
Democratic peace theory
Deterrence theory
Dictatorship
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eq_history
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
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eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Erich Ludendorff
Fourteen Points
French Army
Fritz Fischer
Gambling for resurrection
Germany's Aims in the First World War
Hindenburg Line
Imperialism
International relations
John Mearsheimer
Joseph Joffre
Kerensky Offensive
Left Bank of the Rhine
Macedonian Front
Max Hoffmann
Military dictatorship
Military history
Nivelle Offensive
Ottoman Empire
Pacifism
Peace treaty
Plan XVII
Polish Border Strip
Politique
Probability
Prussia
Regime change
Reichstag Peace Resolution
Revolution of 1905
Russian Revolution
Schlieffen Plan
Security dilemma
Separate peace
Superiority (short story)
Sykes-Picot Agreement
That Justice Be Done
Treaty of Alliance (1778)
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
Treaty of San Stefano
U-boat
Unrestricted submarine warfare
War
War cabinet
War reparations
War termination
Warfare
World War I
Product details
- ISBN 9780691049441
- Weight: 510g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 20 Aug 2000
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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What makes wars drag on and why do they end when they do? Here H. E. Goemans brings theoretical rigor and empirical depth to a long-standing question of securities studies. He explores how various government leaders assess the cost of war in terms of domestic politics and their own postwar fates. Goemans first develops the argument that two sides will wage war until both gain sufficient knowledge of the other's strengths and weaknesses so as to agree on the probable outcome of continued war. Yet the incentives that motivate leaders to then terminate war, Goemans maintains, can vary greatly depending on the type of government they represent. The author looks at democracies, dictatorships, and mixed regimes and compares the willingness among leaders to back out of wars or risk the costs of continued warfare. Democracies, according to Goemans, will prefer to withdraw quickly from a war they are not winning in order to appease the populace. Autocracies will do likewise so as not to be overthrown by their internal enemies.
Mixed regimes, which are made up of several competing groups and which exclude a substantial proportion of the people from access to power, will likely see little risk in continuing a losing war in the hope of turning the tide. Goemans explores the conditions and the reasoning behind this "gamble for resurrection" as well as other strategies, using rational choice theory, statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Germany, Britain, France, and Russia during World War I. In so doing, he offers a new perspective of the Great War that integrates domestic politics, international politics, and battlefield developments.
H. E. Goemans is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duke University.
