A01=Stephen Darwall
Admiration
Allan Gibbard
American Philosophical Association
Analogy
Aristotle
Author_Stephen Darwall
Awareness
Category=QDTQ
Conscience
Consciousness
Consequentialism
Consideration
Courage
Criticism
David Hume
De se
Deliberation
Derek Parfit
Disposition
Emotivism
Empathy
Empathy-altruism
Enthusiasm
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eq_isMigrated=2
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Ethics
Eudaimonia
Explanation
Feeling
Good and evil
Grief
Harry Frankfurt
Hedonism
Hypothesis
Hypothetical imperative
Imagination
Michael Slote
Mimicry
Morality
Normative
Normative ethics
Paternalism
Perfectionism (psychology)
Peter Railton
Phenomenon
Philip Kitcher
Philosopher
Pleasure
Practical reason
Principle
Psychological egoism
Psychology
Rational agent
Rational choice theory
Rational egoism
Rationality
Reason
Requirement
Richard Arneson
Richard Brandt
Sadness
Self-esteem
Self-interest
Seriousness
Shame
Social philosophy
Suggestion
Sympathy
Symptom
Theory
Thought
Utilitarianism
Value (ethics)
Well-being
Product details
- ISBN 9780691092539
- Weight: 170g
- Dimensions: 140 x 216mm
- Publication Date: 15 Aug 2004
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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What kind of life best ensures human welfare? Since the ancient Greeks, this question has been as central to ethical philosophy as to ordinary reflection. But what exactly is welfare? This question has suffered from relative neglect. And, as Stephen Darwall shows, it has done so at a price. Presenting a provocative new "rational care theory of welfare," Darwall proves that a proper understanding of welfare fundamentally changes how we think about what is best for people. Most philosophers have assumed that a person's welfare is what is good from her point of view, namely, what she has a distinctive reason to pursue. In the now standard terminology, welfare is assumed to have an "agent-relative normativity." Darwall by contrast argues that someone's good is what one should want for that person insofar as one cares for her. Welfare, in other words, is normative, but not peculiarly for the person whose welfare is at stake. In addition, Darwall makes the radical proposal that something's contributing to someone's welfare is the same thing as its being something one ought to want for her own sake, insofar as one cares.
Darwall defends this theory with clarity, precision, and elegance, and with a subtle understanding of the place of sympathetic concern in the rich psychology of sympathy and empathy. His forceful arguments will change how we understand a concept central to ethics and our understanding of human bonds and human choices.
Stephen Darwall is John Dewey Collegiate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan. He has written widely on the history and the foundations of ethics, and is the author of "Impartial Reason, The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought': 1640-1740", and "Philosophical Ethics". He is also Associate Editor of "Ethics".
