What's Wrong With Microphysicalism?

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A01=Andreas Huttemann
Author_Andreas Huttemann
Billiard Ball
Category=PDA
Category=QDHR
Category=QDTJ
Category=QDTM
causal
Ceteris Paribus Laws
Completely Manifest
compound
Compound Systems
compound systems explanation
Counterfactual Dependency
determination
Determination Relation
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eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_science
Explanatory Gap
Genuine Laws
Kim 1984b
Lawful Behaviour
laws
Mental Properties
metaphysical emergence
Microphysical Entities
Microphysical Laws
Multilayered Conception
mutual dependence in physical systems
Non-ideal Situations
ontological
ontological dependence
part-whole
Part-whole Relation
philosophy of science
Pragmatic Pluralism
priority
Property P1
Quantum Mechanical Systems
real
Real Causal Agents
reductionism critique
relation
special sciences autonomy
Supervenient Causation
systems
Tensor Product
Van Fraassen
Vice Versa
Virtus Dormitiva

Product details

  • ISBN 9780415327947
  • Weight: 362g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 18 Dec 2003
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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'Microphysicalism', the view that whole objects behave the way they do in virtue of the behaviour of their constituent parts, is an influential contemporary view with a long philosophical and scientific heritage. In What's Wrong With Microphysicalism? Andreas Hüttemann offers a fresh challenge to this view.

Hüttemann agrees with the microphysicalists that we can explain compound systems by explaining their parts, but claims that this does not entail a fundamentalism that gives hegemony to the micro-level. At most, it shows that there is a relationship of determination between parts and wholes, but there is no justification for taking this relationship to be asymmetrical rather than one of mutual dependence. Hüttemann argues that if this is the case, then microphysicalists have no right to claim that the micro-level is the ultimate agent: neither the parts nor the whole have 'ontological priority'. Hüttemann advocates a pragmatic pluralism, allowing for different ways to describe nature.

What's Wrong With Microphysicalism? is a convincing and original contribution to central issues in contemporary philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and metaphysics.

Andreas Hüttemann is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cologne, Germany.

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