When Things Go Wrong

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Action Subsystems
Adaptive Subsystems
Adverse Feedback
Appeasement Strategy
Category=GTU
Category=JMA
Category=JMH
Category=JP
Category=JW
Collective Efficacy
Cybernetic Structure
decision making
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foreign policy analysis
Goal Subsystem
Group Efficacy
Higher Level Subsystems
Holsti Typology
Instrumental Beliefs
Leader's Operational Code
Leader’s Operational Code
Lower Level Subsystems
Mao Zedong
Operational Code
Operational Code Analysis
Operational Code Beliefs
Partial Bombing Halt
Period VI
political psychology
Political Universe
Secretary Of State
Sequential Decision Making
Sequential Decision Processes
Sino American Relationship
South Vietnam

Product details

  • ISBN 9780415895286
  • Weight: 540g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 20 Dec 2011
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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What happens when a government begins a major foreign policy commitment and then later receives new information that it is failing? The question of how to deal with adverse feedback to high-stakes foreign policy speaks to a number of important, current scenarios in international relations. Indeed, how to handle signs that major prior commitments are not working as intended is common to every aspect of human existence—from the owner of an old car who has to decide whether to make additional repairs after a critical breakdown, to management deciding what course to follow when a new investment fails.

Important work has been undertaken on this decision dilemma in a variety of fields. This book brings many of these insights to bear on the especially challenging circumstances where life and death and international politics can add dramatically to the costs of ineffective reactions. The esteemed contributors to this book offer explanations and illustrative case studies of these critical choice points in foreign and national security policy. They offer alternative theoretical frameworks for determining if and when policy will change in response to evidence of failing efforts. Competing theories from several of disciplines—primarily psychology, political science and management—offer insight into a subject that has been rarely studied in foreign policy, yet is as current as today’s headlines.

Charles F. Hermann is a Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University