A01=Christina L. Davis
Accountability
Adjudication
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
Author_Christina L. Davis
Behalf
Bilateral trade
Bilateralism
Calculation
Cambridge University Press
Case study
Category=KCLT
Commercial policy
Conflict management
Consideration
Criticism
De facto
Defendant
Democracy
Developed country
Diplomacy
Dispute mechanism
Dispute Settlement Body
Dumping (pricing policy)
Economic policy
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
Export
Export subsidy
Filing (legal)
Foreign policy
Free trade
Institution
Intellectual property
International court
International law
International trade
International trade law
Lawsuit
Lawyer
Legal proceeding
Legislation
Legislature
Liberalization
Market (economics)
Market access
Market power
Negotiation
Nontariff Barrier
North American Free Trade Agreement
Office of the United States Trade Representative
Parliamentary system
Policy
Politician
Politics
Precedent
Princeton University
Protectionism
Ratification
Regional integration
Requirement
Result
Statistics
Strike action
Subsidy
Tariff
Trade agreement
Trade barrier
Trade war
Treaty
Uncertainty
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
Uruguay Round
Voluntary export restraints
World Trade Organization
Product details
- ISBN 9780691152769
- Weight: 454g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 27 May 2012
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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The World Trade Organization (WTO) oversees the negotiation and enforcement of formal rules governing international trade. Why do countries choose to adjudicate their trade disputes in the WTO rather than settling their differences on their own? In Why Adjudicate?, Christina Davis investigates the domestic politics behind the filing of WTO complaints and reveals why formal dispute settlement creates better outcomes for governments and their citizens. Davis demonstrates that industry lobbying, legislative demands, and international politics influence which countries and cases appear before the WTO. Democratic checks and balances bias the trade policy process toward public lawsuits and away from informal settlements. Trade officials use legal complaints to manage domestic politics and defend trade interests. WTO dispute settlement enables states and domestic groups to signal resolve more effectively, thereby enhancing the information available to policymakers and reducing the risk of a trade war.
Davis establishes her argument with data on trade disputes and landmark cases, including the Boeing-Airbus controversy over aircraft subsidies, disagreement over Chinese intellectual property rights, and Japan's repeated challenges of U.S. steel industry protection. In her analysis of foreign trade barriers against U.S. exports, Davis explains why the United States gains better outcomes for cases taken to formal dispute settlement than for those negotiated. Case studies of Peru and Vietnam show that legal action can also benefit developing countries.
Christina L. Davis is associate professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University. She is the author of Food Fights over Free Trade: How International Institutions Promote Agricultural Trade Liberalization (Princeton).
