Wittgenstein on Mathematics

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A01=David Dolby
A01=Schroeder Severin
A01=Severin Schroeder
Arithmetical Propositions
Author_David Dolby
Author_Schroeder Severin
Author_Severin Schroeder
Big Typescript
Category=PBB
Category=QDHR
Consistency Proof
Conventionalism
Deviant mathematics
Deviant Pupil
Diagonal Proof
Empirical Propositions
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
equivalence classes
Euclid's Proof
Euclid’s Proof
false equations
Frege
Frege's Definition
Frege’s Definition
Fs =d
Godel's incompleteness theorems
Grammar View
Greatest Prime Number
Hilbert formalism critique
Hilbert's formalism
Impossibility Proof
Incompleteness Theorem
infinite regress objection
LFM.
Liar Paradox
logic and language analysis
logicism
Ludwig Wittgenstein's mathematics philosophy
mathematical conventionalism
Mathematical Expressions
mathematical proposition
Mathematical Propositions
Number Words
one-to-one correlation
philosophy of logic
philosophy of mathematics
PR 141b
proof theory foundations
Quine
RFM
Rule-Following
rule-following paradox
Russell's Paradox
Russell’s Paradox
Severin Schroeder
The Big Typescript
TLP.
Tractatus
Transitive Counting
Unmarried Man
Vice Versa
Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein mathematics philosophy analysis
Wittgenstein's Metaphors
Wittgenstein's Objections
Wittgenstein’s Metaphors
Wittgenstein’s Objections

Product details

  • ISBN 9781844658626
  • Weight: 630g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 30 Dec 2020
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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This book offers a detailed account and discussion of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics. In Part I, the stage is set with a brief presentation of Frege’s logicist attempt to provide arithmetic with a foundation and Wittgenstein’s criticisms of it, followed by sketches of Wittgenstein’s early views of mathematics, in the Tractatus and in the early 1930s. Then (in Part II), Wittgenstein’s mature philosophy of mathematics (1937-44) is carefully presented and examined. Schroeder explains that it is based on two key ideas: the calculus view and the grammar view. On the one hand, mathematics is seen as a human activity — calculation — rather than a theory. On the other hand, the results of mathematical calculations serve as grammatical norms. The following chapters (on mathematics as grammar; rule-following; conventionalism; the empirical basis of mathematics; the role of proof) explore the tension between those two key ideas and suggest a way in which it can be resolved. Finally, there are chapters analysing and defending Wittgenstein’s provocative views on Hilbert’s Formalism and the quest for consistency proofs and on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems.

Severin Schroeder is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Reading. He has published three monographs on Wittgenstein: Wittgenstein: The Way Out of the Fly Bottle (2006), Wittgenstein Lesen (2009), and Das Privatsprachen-Argument (1998). He is the editor of Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind (2001) and Philosophy of Literature (2010).

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