Wittgenstein on Sensation and Perception

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A01=Michael Hymers
act
Act Object Analysis
analysis
Author_Michael Hymers
Category=CFA
Category=QD
Category=QDHR
Category=QDTK
datum
Epistemic Interpretation
eq_bestseller
eq_dictionaries-language-reference
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
first-person perspective
Grape Varietal
Hacker 1993a
Inverted Spectrum
Inverted Spectrum Hypothesis
Literal Construal
metaphor
misleading
Misleading Metaphor
Multiple Relation Theory
Normal Colour Vision
object
Phantom Limb Syndrome
phenomenal
phenomenal consciousness
Phenomenal Space
Phenomenological Language
philosophy of mind
private language argument
Psychological Predicates
Psychological Vocabulary
Red Things
Ripe Tomato
Semantic Cognitivism
sense
Sense Datum Theories
sense-data theory
sensory qualia analysis
space
Spectrum Inversion
Surveyable Representation
theories
Veridical Perceptions
Wittgenstein perception critique
Wittgenstein's Critique
Wittgenstein's Nachlass
Wittgenstein’s Critique
Wittgenstein’s Nachlass
Zombies

Product details

  • ISBN 9781844658565
  • Weight: 430g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 23 Jan 2017
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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This book offers two novel claims about Wittgenstein’s views and methods on perception as explored in the Philosophical Investigations. The first is an interpretive claim about Wittgenstein: that his views on sensation and perception, including his critique of private language, have their roots in his reflections on sense-datum theories and on what Hymers calls the misleading metaphor of phenomenal space. The second is a major philosophical claim: that Wittgenstein’s critique of the misleading metaphor of phenomenal space is of ongoing relevance to current debates concerning first-person authority and the problem of perception because we are still tempted to draw inferences about the phenomenal that only apply to the physical. Many contemporary discussions of these topics are thus premised on the very confusions Wittgenstein sought to dispel. This book will appeal to Wittgenstein scholars who are interested in the Philosophical Investigations and to philosophers of perception who may think that Wittgenstein’s views are mistaken, irrelevant, or already adequately appreciated.

Michael Hymers is Munro Professor of Metaphysics at Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada. He is the author of Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses (2000) and Wittgenstein and the Practice of Philosophy (2010), and a past editor of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

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