Wittgenstein on Thought and Will

Regular price €198.40
Quantity:
In stock with our UK publisher. 14-28 days
Delivery/Collection within 10-20 working days
14 days return policy Shipping & Delivery
A01=Roger Teichmann
analytic philosophy
Author_Roger Teichmann
Berkeley's Account
Berkeley’s Account
Broken Arm
Category=CFA
Category=QDHR
Category=QDTK
cation
CV 80e
Desire Pair
Embodied Human
eq_bestseller
eq_dictionaries-language-reference
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
Fake Car
Fi Rst Person
first person perspective
Grammatical Proposition
historical context philosophy
Indefi Nable
infi
infinite
intentionality
Intersubstituted Salva Veritate
justifi
Logical Picture
Mental Picture
mental representation
Moore's Paradox
Moore’s Paradox
nite
Nonexistent Thing
ower
Performative Utterance
person
philosophy of mind
Pro Attitude
Propositional Attitudes
Readiness Potential
red
Red Patch
regress
rst
Salva Veritate
Sensory Deprivation Tank
Sincere Assertion
Singular Term
Sugar Plum Fairy
True Substitution Instance
Wittgenstein thought and will analysis

Product details

  • ISBN 9781844658596
  • Weight: 385g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 04 May 2015
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
Secure checkout Fast Shipping Easy returns

This book examines in detail Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ideas on thought, thinking, will and intention, as those ideas developed over his lifetime. It also puts his ideas into context by a comparison both with preceding thinkers and with subsequent ones. The first chapter gives an account of the historical and philosophical background, discussing such thinkers as Plato, Descartes, Berkeley, Frege and Russell. The final chapter looks at the legacy of, and reactions to, Wittgenstein. These two chapters frame the central three chapters, devoted to Wittgenstein’s ideas on thought and will. Chapter 2 discusses the sense in which both thought and will represent, or are about, reality; Chapter 3 considers Wittgenstein’s critique of the picture of an inner process, and the role that behaviour and context play in his views on thought and will; while Chapter 4 centres on the question What sort of thing is it that thinks or wills?, in particular examining Wittgenstein’s ideas concerning the first person (I) and concerning statements like I am thinking or I intend to do X.

Roger Teichmann is Lecturer in Philosophy at St Hilda's College, University of Oxford, UK.

More from this author