Wittgenstein’s Critique of Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement

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A01=James R. Connelly
Author_James R. Connelly
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Christopher Pincock
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Fraser MacBride and Samuel Lebens
Graham Stevens
Gregory Landini
Nicholas Griffin and Steven Sommerville
Peter Hanks
philosophy
Rosalind Carey

Product details

  • ISBN 9781839994784
  • Weight: 1g
  • Dimensions: 153 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 10 Jun 2025
  • Publisher: Anthem Press
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Paperback
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Wittgenstein’s May–June 1913 critique of Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgement (or MRTJ) marked a crucial turning point in the lives of two great twentieth-century thinkers. It was also a watershed moment within the history of analytic philosophy itself. Yet scholarly consensus around a satisfactory interpretation of the nature of the critique, the extent of and reasons for its impact on Russell, along with the role it played within Wittgenstein’s development have remained elusive. With these facts in mind, this book aims to accomplish four interrelated goals. The first is to develop a compelling reading of Wittgenstein’s May–June 1913 critique of Russell’s MRTJ. The second is to defend this reading, called the ‘logical interpretation’ (or LI) against its most prominent competitors in the scholarly literature. Third, the book aims to situate Wittgenstein’s critique of the MRTJ and Russell’s reaction to it, within the broader context of each of Wittgenstein’s and Russell’s respective philosophical developments. Fourth and finally, the book aims to introduce students and scholars of early analytic philosophy to, and familiarize them with the historical events, textual evidence, scholarly controversies, letters, notes and diagrams, consideration of which is integral to constructing a plausible reading of Wittgenstein’s objection.

James R. Connelly is an associate professor at Trent University Durham-GTA in Oshawa, ON, Canada. His research focuses on the history of analytic philosophy, philosophy of language, Wittgenstein and Russell.

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