The First World War left a legacy of chaos that is still with us a century later. Why did European leaders resort to war and why did they not end it sooner? Roger L. Ransom sheds new light on this enduring puzzle by employing insights from prospect theory and notions of risk and uncertainty. He reveals how the interplay of confidence, fear, and a propensity to gamble encouraged aggressive behavior by leaders who pursued risky military strategies in hopes of winning the war. The result was a series of military disasters and a war of attrition which gradually exhausted the belligerents without producing any hope of ending the war. Ultimately, he shows that the outcome of the war rested as much on the ability of the Allied powers to muster their superior economic resources to continue the fight as it did on success on the battlefield.
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Product Details
Weight: 570g
Dimensions: 153 x 228mm
Publication Date: 28 Jun 2018
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication City/Country: United Kingdom
Language: English
ISBN13: 9781108454353
About Roger L. Ransom
Roger L. Ransom is Distinguished Professor of History and Economics Emeritus at the University of California Riverside. He is best known for his work with Richard Sutch on the American Civil War and his many publications include the books One Kind of Freedom (co-authored with Richard Sutch Cambridge 2001) Conflict and Compromise (Cambridge 1990) and The Confederate States of America: What Might Have Been (2005). He was the president of the Economic History Association in 2005 and was awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship and the distinguished teaching award from the University of California Riverside. He also won the Arthur H. Cole Prize from the Economic History Association and the Clio Can Award from the Cliometric Society.
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