Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design

Name: Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design
Brand: Cambridge University Press
SKU: 9781107135345
Price: 100.79 EUR
Availability: InStock

★★★★★

English

Following the successful PCS Auction conducted by the US Federal Communications Commission in 1994, auctions have replaced traditional ways of allocating valuable radio spectrum, a key resource for any mobile telecommunications operator. Spectrum auctions have raised billions of dollars worldwide and have become a role model for market-based approaches in the public and private sectors. The design of spectrum auctions is a central application of game theory and auction theory due to its importance in industry and the theoretical challenges it presents. Several auction formats have been developed with different properties addressing fundamental questions about efficiently selling multiple objects to a group of buyers. This comprehensive handbook features classic papers and new contributions by international experts on all aspects of spectrum auction design, including pros and cons of different auctions and lessons learned from theory, experiments, and the field, providing a valuable resource for regulators, telecommunications professionals, consultants, and researchers. See more

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Product Details

Weight: 1750g
Dimensions: 183 x 261mm
Publication Date: 26 Oct 2017
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication City/Country: United Kingdom
Language: English
ISBN13: 9781107135345

About

Martin Bichler is Professor of Informatics at the Technische Universität München (TUM) and a faculty member at the TUM School of Management. He is known for his academic work on market design and he has acted as a consultant for private and public organizations including regulators telecoms and procurement organizations. Projects in which he is involved include the design of auctions for industrial procurement logistics advertising fishery access rights and spectrum sales. His research addresses algorithmic game-theoretical and behavioral questions and has appeared in leading journals in computer science economics operations research and management science. He is currently Editor of Business and Information Systems Engineering and serves on the editorial boards of several academic journals. Jacob Goeree is SHARP Professor and Director of the AGORA Center for Market Design at University of New South Wales Sydney. He is a world-leading experimenter theorist and market designer whose research has influenced the design of spectrum auctions and markets for pollution permits and fishing shares. Goeree was Research Fellow of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and is Fellow of the Econometric Society and the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. He served as President of the Economic Science Association and as Editor of Experimental Economics. He is an Associate Editor of the Journal of Economic Theory and Games and Economic Behavior.